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Crawford: Density, Affordable Housing and Social Inclusion

DENSITY, AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: A
MODEST PROPOSAL FOR CAPE TOWN
Colin Crawford *

I.

INTRODUCTION: IS
POSSIBLE?

A

DENSER, MORE INCLUSIONARY CAPE TOWN

Cape Town, those of us who attended the splendid Study Space seminar
there learned in the last week of June 2016, is a city where housing remains
spatially segregated by race, a direct function of historical planning patterns. 1
While there is some lateral movement between the areas in which the three
dominant racial groups – whites, coloreds and Africans, to use the local
categories – live, the former townships remain poor and mostly black African,
while the coastal zones of the city, abutting the city’s majestic mountains and
wedged along the unforgettable coastline, continue to be mostly white. 2 To
some extent, as in other countries – the U.S. and Brazil, to cite just two other
examples – this separation is a function today of economic power as much as of
deliberate discrimination, 3 although as both the U.S. and the South African
experiences tell us, one should never underestimate the force of unspoken but
conscious discrimination. 4
*

Robert C. Cudd Professor of Environmental Law, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA. I am
grateful to Stephen Berrisford, who provided extremely illuminating comments. Divesh Kaul,
SJD candidate at Tulane, provided invaluable research help in the preparation of this article. I
am grateful to the Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth for the
opportunity to join Study Space IX. This article was written while on sabbatical from Tulane
University and the holder of the Universidad de Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M)-Santander
Cátedra de Excelencia in Madrid, Spain. I am deeply grateful to UC3M and to its Instituto
Pascual Madoz del Territorio, Urbanismo y Medio Ambiente for the opportunity.

1

Stephen Berrisford, Unravelling Apartheid Spatial Planning Legislation in South Africa: A
Case Study, 22 Urban Forum 247-248 (2011), available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12132-011-9119-8 (doi:10.1007/s12132-0119119-8) (last accessed March 3, 2017).
2

Presentation of Tristan Görgens (Western Cape Government) to the Study Space XI seminar,
July 1, 2016.

3

See, e.g., in the U.S. context, Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography
of Economic Development, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 295, 318-319 (1999). For a comparison of
all three countries, see Beyond Racism: Race and Inequality in Brazil, South Africa, and the
United States (Charles V. Hamilton et al. eds., 2001).

4
See, e.g. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The Court’s Denial of Racial Social Debt, 40-DEC
Hum. Rts. 12 (2011); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331(1988)
(on the political importance of retaining consciousness of historical racial subordination); see
generally McFarlane, supra note 3.
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Another aspect of the situation we learned about in Cape Town, like
most South African cities, has serious housing needs. 5 To this outsider’s eye,
somewhat paradoxically, despite the housing needs, land use patterns in Cape
Town are also remarkably un-dense. 6 The resulting sprawl is of particular
concern because of the city’s and the region’s notable environmental resources,
which merit care and protection. 7 So, it seemed to me, one way to address all of
these concerns with a focused strategy would be to seize upon the lack of
density, and specifically to focus on creating opportunities to build denser, more
vertical housing construction and spatial development practices.
Now one who lives in a glass house, so goes the saying, should not throw
stones. So, it is with some trepidation that I – from a glass house – offer some
suggestions about ways to achieve housing in Cape Town that is both denser
and more inclusionary. The glass house I inhabit, in this case, is of course, the
one of segregated housing. Although some gains have been made to provide for
more inclusionary housing in the United States, 8 there remains much to be done.
Even very recently, commentators have observed that housing patterns in the
United States remain deeply segregated. 9 As William Faulkner famously wrote
in his novel Requiem for a Nun – and the reference is especially apt in the case
of U.S. and South African housing discrimination alike, “the past isn’t dead. It
isn’t even past.” 10 This is to acknowledge that in the remarks that follow, I am
keenly aware that both in the United States and South Africa, the kinds of
initiatives discussed here, initiatives aimed at dismantling generations and
generations of oppressive and deliberate segregated housing is no easy matter.
One could argue, furthermore, that it is of limited utility to try and argue
for inclusionary housing in Cape Town, even if focused on density, and for at
least two reasons. First, it might be claimed that the extent of the South Africa’s
social and economic inequality make it utopian at best to argue for such goals,

5

Republic of South Africa Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs,
Integrated Urban Development Framework 22-23 (2016).

6

Presentation of David Savage (National Treasury City Support Programme)to the Study
Space IX seminar, June 28, 2016.

7

See, e.g., Cape Town Environment, at
http://www.capetown.at/heritage/environment/index.htm (2008) (detailing some of the area’s
environmental riches) (last accessed March 3, 2017).
8

The most celebrated example is surely Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975).

9

See, e.g. Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation §§ 2:1-2.2
(2016).
10

Quoted in The Daily Dish, Atlantic Magazine, March 18, 2008, available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2008/03/-the-past-isnt-dead-it-isnt-evenpast/218789/ (last accessed March 3, 2017)
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where millions are still relegated to slum housing conditions. 11 As the South
African Constitutional Court famously observed in 2000, the desperate, shortterm needs of millions may not be sacrificed to medium- and longer-term
housing accommodation goals. 12 Second, South African land use scholars have
studied inclusionary housing practices in the U.S. and elsewhere and found
them coming up wanting as ideas relevant to the South African context. One
recent commentator, reviewing the South African literature and a study that
focused on Johannesburg, noted that “in particular due to the resistance of the
private property sector and the middle class, the significant gap between the
income of the wealthy and the poor, and institutional issues” 13, inclusionary
housing efforts of any stripe were something of a non-starter in South Africa.
The report further noted that, in addition to a the relatively modest level of
private housing construction in South Africa, any efforts at inclusionary housing
were simply not an appropriate response to achieving land use justice in South
Africa: “it is unlikely that inclusionary housing provisions, if enacted, will make
any substantial impact on the South African urban form in the short to medium
term.” 14
Nonetheless, what I would like to offer in this short article are some
thoughts about ways Cape Town might benefit from lessons in the United
States’ long and still continuing struggle with racially segregated housing and
to do so by promoting strategies that are not only inclusionary in aim but also
more environmentally sustainable if developed properly. I do this in part from
the conviction that this is a benefit of any comparative legal scholarship – to
suggest different ways of looking at problems. In this, I will particularly
examine density-focused incentives. Indeed, incentive-based practices, it seems
to me, might have some traction in the Cape Town/South African context, a
suggestion that is supported, in fact, by the authors of the study largely
discounting inclusionary housing in the South African context. 15 Moreover, and
11

According to the United Nations, in 1990 8,834,000 urban South Africans lived in slums, a
number that reduced only to 7,858,000 by 2014. United Nations Statistics Division,
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Millennium Development Goals Indicators 2014,
available at https://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=711&crid= (last accessed
March 3, 2017).
12
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, South African Constitutional
Court, Case 11/00 (decided October 4, 2000). See also Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road et al v.
City of Johannesburg, South African Constitutional Court, Case CCT 24/07 (decided February
19, 2008) (Constitutional Court prohibited eviction of those without homes from occupied
buildings because this would render them homeless and ordered parties to find a solution.).
13
Stuart Paul Denoon-Stevens, Developing an appropriate land use methodology to promote
spatially just, formal retail areas in developing countries: The case of the City of Cape Town,
South Africa, 54 Land Use Policy 18, 20 (2016).
14

Id. at 19-20.

15

Neil Klug, Margot Rubin and Alison Todes, Inclusionary housing policy: a tool for reshaping South Africa’s spatial legacy? 28 J. Hous. & Built Env. 667, 677 (2013).

83
Published by Reading Room, 2017

3

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy

[Vol 1:1 2017]

to emphasize a point made above, density incentives, if executed carefully, have
the advantage of being more environmentally responsible because they promote
less sprawl. 16 This is consistent with South Africa’s commitment to more
sustainable land use practices. 17
These techniques, I am thus suggesting, might be useful as part of a
larger effort to address contemporary urbanization patterns in South Africa
generally and Cape Town in particular. As a government report observed in
2016:
South Africa’s urban areas continue to be hampered by a legacy
of racial segregation, poverty and exclusion from social and
economic opportunities. The spatial legacy is one of sprawl, low
densities, functional segregation between home and work, and
overlapping racial and class separations As a result, high levels
of inefficiency and wasteful use of scarce resources (especially
land and infrastructure networks) characterise the country’s
cities and towns. . . . Despite significant service delivery and
development gains since 1994, apartheid spatial patterns have
largely not been reversed. Indeed, in part because of the pressure
to provide housing and services quickly after 1994, most of the
post-1994 infrastructure investments have unintentionally
served to reinforce the apartheid status quo The cumulative
effect is that it is harder to reverse apartheid geographies today
than in 1994. 18
Clearly, then, some aggressive and innovative thinking is required to try
and address this social and spatial logjam. And if that thinking can also have
residual benefits for protecting the physical environment, so much the better.
While I know of course this will not be easy, I modestly suggest, nonetheless,
that density-focused inclusionary land management practices might be a useful
part of the mix in South Africa. To that end, and following this introductory Part
I, Part II will discuss two density tools that have had some success in the U.S.
context, highlighting their use not just to promote density but also as
inclusionary housing tools. Part III will offer thoughts on the integration of pro16

See, e.g. Margaret E. Byerly, A Report to the IPCC on Research Connecting Human
Settlements, Infrastructure and Climate Change, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 936, 942 (2010-2011).
But see Paige Pavone, Smart Sprawl? Green Aspirations and the Lowdown on High-Density
Suburbia, 40 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 145 (2015).
17

See, e.g., comments of then South African Minister of Housing Lindiwe Susulu at a 2006
Slum/Shack Dwellers International Conference, available as Partnerships between
government and slum/shack dwellers’ federations, 18:2 Env’t and Urbanization 401 (2006),
available at http://sasdialliance.org.za/wpcontent/uploads/docs/archive/2006_Sisulu_Environment_and_Urbanization.pdf (last accessed
March 3, 2017)(expressing a commitment to, inter alia, sustainable development practices).
18

Supra note 5 at 22.
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density and pro-racial and –class integration tools. Finally, the concluding Part
IV will query what traction such strategies might have in the Cape Town
context, keenly aware as I am of the inherent limitations for any outsider to
make suggestions for a social and legal reality he does not deeply understand.
Yet it is also my contention that the techniques discussed below could
avoid the two pitfalls identified by Berrisford in so many post-colonial African
planning systems, namely failure to identify and involve key stakeholders in
decision making and an over-reliance on highly elitist, technical approaches to
spatial planning. 19 In doing so, however, I need also acknowledge the same
author’s admonitions elsewhere about the real political, social, economic and
practical impediments to putting too much faith in the mantras of participatory
and democratic planning models in a complicated human terrain like that of
post-apartheid South Africa. 20
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF SELECTED U.S. EFFORTS
DENSITY FOR INCLUSIONARY HOUSING.

TO

PROMOTE URBAN

The challenges of providing quality housing for all of a country’s
citizens are inevitably daunting. This is especially true, of course, for countries
marked with high levels of economic inequality, such as the United States and
South Africa. In such contexts, it becomes especially important to conceive of
the housing need not in isolation, but as one part of an integrated package of
social and economic transformation. Thus, as recently as 2012, in the United
States, the National Coalition for the Homeless proposed a comprehensive
housing and social services model statute, the “Bring America Home Act”,
which sought to improve national housing conditions by adopting a wide range
of measures including, for example, better transportation infrastructure and
employment opportunities. 21 Similarly, while better housing has been a national
priority in South Africa since the end of apartheid in 1994 and the adoption of
the new constitution in 1996, housing has been a special priority, and one
recognized not to exist in isolation from addressing other social needs.22
Therefore, in what follows in this section it should be remembered that neither
19
Stephen Berrisford, Why It Is Difficult to Change Urban Planning Laws in African
Countries, 22 Urb. Forum 209, p. 2 (2011), available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12132-011-9121-1 (last accessed March 3, 2017).
20

Id. at pp. 9-10

21

See National Coalition for the Homeless Bring America Home Act, available at
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/advocacy/baha.html (last accessed February 28, 2017).
22
The 1996 South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights, Chapter 2, article 26 promises
“adequate housing” to all South Africans. Chapter 2’s 39 articles guarantee provision of over
30 different rights, from civil and political rights to social and economic guarantees. See
http://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/chapter-2-bill-rights#26 (last accessed February
28, 2017).
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of the two density management options discussed here are meant to be
understood in isolation. Rather, it need be recognized that they are possible
techniques to be used in conjunction with a wider menu of techniques all
addressed to creating a more inclusive and sustainable social fabric.
A. FORCED URBAN CONCENTRATION: AN URBAN GROWTH BOUNDARY.
The example of the State of Oregon is celebrated in the urbanism
literature of the United States. 23 The northwestern state, in some respects not
unlike that of Western Cape Province, is notable for its coastline, its mountains
and its forests: a rare and precious combination of natural assets. To manage
those assets in the long term, starting in the late 1960s, the State began focusing
on a statewide planning process. 24 In a country where land use management has
long remained a secure bastion of local control, 25 this move was in its way
revolutionary. The resulting statute 26 created, among other initiatives, a
statewide planning agency. But most observers agree that “[t]he most
noteworthy planning tool of the Oregon program is the urban growth boundary
(UGB), a legally binding, legislatively-created line that separates ‘rural land’
from ‘urban land.’” 27 Moreover, as a recent commentator observed, the
distinction between “rural” and “urban” land “is profound. Land outside of the
UGH cannot be developed for urban uses, absent a goal exception. Land within
the UGB must be sufficient to accommodate urban needs and populations and
must also be used efficiently.” 28
The UGB system has grown over time from one of voluntary
compliance to a wide-ranging, state-sponsored, constitutionally and popularly
approved effort to manage growth, with a focus on densifying urban growth.29
A key argument in favour of an UGB, and a measure of is success, is premised
on the existence of opportunities to increase density within the city boundaries,
primarily by increasing the availability of multifamily housing in existing
neighbourhoods and by infilling and redeveloping underutilized urban

23

For a list of some jurisdictions that have adopted the concept, see Lisa Grow Sun, Smart
Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future of the American City, 2011
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 2157, 2186 note 146 (2011).

24

Edward J. Sullivan, Urban Growth Management in Portland, Oregon, 93 Or. L. Rev. 455,
467 (2014).

25

See, e.g. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 Colum. L. Rev 1, 3 (1994) (stating that “[l]and use control is the most important local
regulatory power.”)
26

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.030-.070 (2013) (providing the statutory scheme for Land Control
and Development Commission).
27

Supra note 24 at 457 (citations in original deleted).

28

Id. at 457-8 (citations in original deleted).

29

Id. at 494-5.
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spaces.” 30 To be sure, in the South African context, where rural land has tended
to dominate and overpower efforts at urban land reform, this presents a
challenge. 31 On the other hand, a planning model like that of Oregon State, one
that integrates rural and urban planning mechanisms, might present advantages
in South Africa, where the relation between the two distinct uses is understood.
In Portland, Oregon’s largest city, the effects of the UGB have been
notable. When established, the UGB left an area equivalent to a little less than
two-thirds of the area of the city’s footprint for development. 32 Twenty years
into the experiment, however, concerns were expressed that, among other
factors, the Portland UGB 1) had not corrected for tendencies to sprawl and 2)
appeared to have been responsible, at least in part, for raising residential rental
and purchase rates. 33 One positive result, however, was that density rates had
increased. 34 This early observation was confirmed more strongly still another
20 years later. 35 In other words, the UGB was not established and then left
untouched, but underwent constant scrutiny, discussion, struggle and
readjustment to serve its underlying goals. One very clear lesson that emerged
nearly 40 years into the Oregon and Portland UGB experiment is that this was
one technique in an integrated approach to land use management focused on the
needs of citizens, also including but not limited to “the reduction in minimum
lot sizes, the construction of affordable housing, the assumption by the state of
a very large percentage of school expenses, the creation of a metropolitan
transportation authority, the adoption of mixed-use zoning, coordination of
planning for housing development and planning for transportation, and a quasiregional government that could plan for regional growth and that could decide,
through its published plans, where that growth should go.” 36
To be sure, such integration of efforts and functions is appealing
anywhere. In Cape Town, however, therein lies the challenge. As Berrisford
reminds us, in a country like South Africa, ill-staffed with professionals
adequately trained to execute existing land use management plans, it can be

30

Supra note 23 at 2185-2186 (but noting that this may create incentives to develop in areas
prone to natural risks).

31

Supra note 19 at p.10.

32

Supra note 24 at 477-478.

33

Keith W. Dearborn & Ann M. Gigi, Planner's Panacea or Pandora's Box: A Realistic
Assessment of the Role of Urban Growth Areas in Achieving Growth Management Goals, 16
U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 975, 1005 (1993).

34

Id. at 1006.

35

Benjamin P. Glaser, Constitutional, Political, And Philosophical Struggle: Measure 37 and
the Oregon Urban Growth Boundary Controversy, 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 595, 599-600(2007).
36

Terry J. Tondro, Sprawl and its Enemies: An Introductory Discussion of Two Cities' Efforts
to Control Sprawl, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 511, 535 (2002).
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counter-productive to imagine such an ambitious planning universe. 37
Nonetheless, it is also important to set the right aspirational model, and, at least,
this model selects one that does not leave the planning to a single group of
individuals, but rather understands land use management decisions as being part
of a comprehensive social policymaking effort.
In that connection, the question about a UGB in the context of this article
must also be this question: how can a UGB also be socially inclusionary? The
discussion that follows about density bonus incentives for inclusion attempts a
partial answer to that question.
B. DENSITY BONUS INCENTIVES FOR INCLUSION.
The basic density mechanism as a land use management tool is
straightforward. A land use code or ordinance provides a mechanism for
developers to receive a “bonus” to build out in some form (more units, more
area, more height, etc.) than the code or ordinance might otherwise permit, in
exchange for satisfying some other requirement. That other requirement equally
can take any form desired by the regulating entity, whether to promote mixed
use or some more ambitious social goal, such as greater economic or racial or
ethnic inclusion, or even use of more environmentally friendly building
technologies, for example. 38
Density bonus incentives have been tried and discussed for nearly 60
years in the United States, dating back at least to the 1960s, when they were
used in New York City to seek private provision of street-level amenities. 39 Of
greater relevance to this article, however, is the 1979 example of the State of
California. In that year, “the California Legislature adopted a statute requiring
cities and counties to grant prescribed density bonuses or equivalent financial
incentives to projects that provide specified percentages of units afford- able to
low- or moderate-income households.” 40 Notably, then, the California
legislation, like many such efforts, were addressing a problem well known to
South Africans, namely housing affordability. In addition, the statute aimed to
create more inclusionary housing since in the United States, as in South Africa,
housing income inequality was and is disproportionately correlated with race

37

Supra note 19 at pp. 3 and 19.

38

James D. Brown, Biophilic Laws: Planning for Cities with Nature, 34 Va. Envtl. L.J. 52,
79-102 (2016).
39

Robert A. Johnston, Seymour I. Schwartz, Geoffrey A. Wandesforde-Smith and Michael
Caplan, Selling Zoning: Do Density Bonus Incentives for Moderate-Cost Housing Work, 36 J.
of Urb. and Contemp. L. 45, 49 (1989).
40

Id. at 46.
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and ethnicity. 41
This is a problem of even more complex dimension in Cape Town than
it was even in the economically unequal State of California of the late 1970s;
South Africa’s economic inequality – and the poverty that undergirds it – is of
an entirely different dimension altogether. 42 Nonetheless, for a place – namely
Cape Town – where housing affordability is an issue, not just for the urban poor
but for the so-called “gap” segment of the population. (The “gap market”, in
South African parlance, refers to the approximately 28% of the population who
earn enough not to qualify for free or subsidized housing distribution programs
and not enough to qualify for mortgage finance and so are caught in between
with few options to secure good housing.) This situation suggests that it might
merit consideration. 43 However, this must be done with great caution. Some
land use scholars conclude that density bonuses were an idea that developed in
response to other, prior land use management techniques that were exclusionary
in nature, such as zoning, that worked whether consciously or not to exclude
economic and racial and ethnic minorities.44 A conclusion of this research is
thus to question the underlying assumptions of the entire land use management
system, rather than constantly presenting new proposals (like density bonuses)
to remedy past wrongs. Given that South Africa’s history is also marked by a
long history of using land use techniques to exclude on the basis of race and
ethnicity, this concern merits reflection. 45
In the context of density bonuses directed to some form of social
engineering, two questions regularly occur. First, the bonus scheme must be
designed to permit the developer to make a profit despite the provision of
subsidized units. Early studies indicate that at a minimum, at least one marketrate unit needed to be provided for every subsidized unit. 46 Second, if the efforts
are to succeed in establishing vibrant, mixed neighborhoods (mixed in whatever
sense), the question emerged as to how long the subsidies need remain in place.
Again, in early studies, researchers concluded that the subsidies needed to
remain in effect, via deed restrictions, for as long as 60 years and at least for
41

James Surowiecki, The Widening Racial Wealth Divide, The New Yorker (Oct. 10, 2016),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/the-widening-racial-wealthdivide (last accessed March 3, 2016). On South Africa see supra note 1.
42

See supra note 11.

43

See supra note 2. The Johannesburg-based Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa
(CAHF) has published usefully on issues related to the “gap” market. See, e.g. Understanding
the challenges in South Africa’s Gap Housing Market and opportunities for the RDP Resale
Market (18 June 2015), available online at http://housingfinanceafrica.org/app/uploads/Noteon-the-Gap-Market-and-mobilising-RDP-18_6_15.pdf (last accessed March 28, 2017)
44

Supra note 39 at 47.

45

See supra note 1.

46

Supra note 39 at 50.
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between 20-30 years. 47 Moreover, throughout the process, the program needs to
be designed so that it will attract developers. That is, it must be appealing
enough as an investment opportunity so that, in what are typically voluntary
programs, a developer will want to invest time, energy and financial resources
in a density bonus project and not some other project. At least one South African
researcher has concluded that no such program is likely to be attractive in the
country’s relatively modest private housing development sector. In Cape Town
in particular, land use management scholar and planning lawyer Stephen
Berrisford is skeptical that such programs could have success in Cape Town in
particular, where, in his words, “we suffer from constrained capacity.” In
Berrisford’s view, such a proposal, in the Cape Town context may be utopian
and unrealistic, observing that while “an approach such as the one proposed
might just work in Cape Town, but probably not, and it certainly wouldn’t work
in other, less capable municipalities. The City of Cape Town is relatively well
capacitated in South African terms, but even it will struggle to implement [such]
a new instrument.” 48
One early lesson that has been repeated over and over again in the
density bonus literature is that it is essential to have dedication on the part of
the spatial development planning staff 49 to resist other efforts – such as
permitting upzoning and other more exclusionary efforts – in the service of the
use of density bonuses to create more inclusionary housing options. (Upzoning
refers to the practice of receiving special exemptions to grant a different zoning
classification for a particular end, such as to allow different uses or to achieve
greater density. It is often controversial because it can occur because of cozy
relationships between regulators and regulated, among other reasons.) 50 This
means, of course, that there must first be social consensus on the need to provide
better and inclusionary housing for all. 51 Stacy Seicshnaydre has conceptualized
47

Id.; see generally Cecily T. Talbert & Nadia L. Costa, Inclusionary Zoning, Chapter 9 in
American Bar Association, Current Trends & Prac. Strategies in Land Use & Zoning (2005).

48

See supra note 13. Berrisford’s view was shared in a private telephone interview.
(Telephone interview March 28, 2017 and email communication April 3, 2017. Notes on file
with author.)
49

I am deliberately avoiding the use here of the phrase “land use planning” because of its
toxic history in the South African context. See supra note 1 at 258. Interestingly, however, the
source of this observation – Cape Town urban lawyer Stephen Berrisford – reports that the
term “land use planning” is now increasingly used in South Africa, shed of its historical
association with apartheid-era practices. (Telephone conversation March 28,, 2017. Notes on
file with author.)
50

Supra note 39 at 53-55; see generally Nicholas Benson, Student Note, A Tale of Two Cities:
Examining the Success of Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances in Montgomery County, Maryland
and Boulder, Colorado, 13 J. Gender Race & Just. 753(2010).
51

In the South African context, Stephen Berrisford has stressed the importance of seeking
such consensus with respect to any planning paradigm chosen, including alignment with
constitutional and legislative authorization for same. Supra note 1 at pp. 13-14.
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the solution as a manner of developing efforts that direct consumers to “opt in”
to inclusionary housing models rather than tolerating policies that allow them
to “opt out” in the search of neighborhoods populated only by people who look
like and earn like themselves. 52 Again, there is South African recognition of the
need to push for inclusion and avoid such situations. 53 Admittedly complicating
such an effort, however, is the possibility – if not the likelihood – of
corruption, 54 which can promote exactly the sort of special deals and cherry
picking of projects that inclusionary efforts seek to avoid. To imagine what this
might mean, consider for example a competitive, public process to develop an
inclusionary housing development. Unless the criteria for selection and the
ways in which the development will, for example, compel people (with
financing, infrastructure incentives or other project advantages) to “opt-in” to
an inclusionary development are crystal clear and the bidding process
thoroughly transparent and above-board, a process seeking to “include” could
easily become a sweetheart deal between regulators and their friends in the
regulated community. In such a situation, moreover, if the criteria as to what
constitutes inclusion (e.g. social and economic diversity, racial and ethnic
diversity, etc.) such a project could spur gentrification and privilege those with
the fewest needs for adequate housing.
In a density incentive program, furthermore, developers thus must be
convinced not just that they will make a profit, but also that a density bonus
program designed to craft mixed neighborhoods can overcome other challenges,
including design challenges and possible downward shifts in price because of
worries about density’s effects on land prices, among other factors. 55 And again,
it needs recognizing that this must be done before a word is spoken about the
fact that in many societies people simply do not want to live near people unlike
themselves. 56
Many commentators have insisted, therefore, that the density bonus

52

Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 967, 987
(2012).

53
See, e.g. Stuart Wilson, Planning for Inclusion in South Africa: The State’s Duty to
Prevent Homelessness and the Potential of “Meaningful Engagement”, 22 Urb. Forum 265
(2011); see also supra note 13.
54

Supra note 19 at pp. 9 & 19.

55

Supra note 39 at 58.

56
As Stephen Berrisford has observed in the South African context: “. . . where land is
developed or redeveloped for the purposes of housing low-income people the neighbours will
inevitably, and many already have done so, challenge the decision on the basis that their rights
to the use and enjoyment of their land will be reduced or lost entirely because of a range of
possible causes such as increased crime, air pollution, water pollution and reduced property
values.” See supra note 1 at p .9.
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practices must be mandatory to produce the desired socially inclusive effect.57
In addition, some argue that density bonus incentive programs must be “deeply
targeted” (meaning reaching deep into a society to provide opportunities for its
least protected) to ensure success, in addition to a wide range of other, equally
ambitious factors, including the requirement that all development in the
municipality be subject to the ordinance. 58 The aim is thus to try and make it
impossible within a jurisdiction to create new housing with directly
exclusionary effects.
In fact, Cape Town’s 2015 Municipal Planning By-Law contemplates
density bonus incentive practices, although the provision is skeletal at best.59
The question remains, then, as to how it might be elaborated to have positive
effects on Cape Town’s human, built and physical environment.
III.

INCLUSIONARY TECHNIQUES AND DENSITY.

As indicated above, density as a goal is itself neutral with respect to the
incentives linked to promote the goal. One possibility is to try and use density
incentives to promote affordable housing that is also inclusionary. In South
Africa, fragmented planning efforts have exposed even well-intentioned spatial
management efforts to failure because of litigation, including constitutional
challenges. 60 This is no less true in the United States context. 61 A review of the
57

See generally supra note 39; and see generally Benson, supra note 50. Stephen Berrisford
now believes that, in light of the especially rigid patterns of racial and social segregation on
the basis of geography that any such program will be especially difficult to achieve in Cape
Town; Berrisford suggests, however, that such initiatives might work more easily in other
South African cities. (Telephone interview March 28,m2017; notes on file with author.)
58

Valerie Feldman, Local Land-use Advocacy: Inclusionary Zoning to Achieve Economic
and Racial Integration 42 Clearinghouse Rev. 61, 66-70 (2008).
59

City of Cape Town Municipal Planning By-Law (2015). Chapter 19 of the By-Law provides
for two strategies – incentive overlay zoning (ICO) and density overlay zoning (DO). The
former “provides a mechanism for designating development incentive measures to land in
order to promote development priorities and strategies as may be identified in the integrated
development plan or spatial plans approved by the City. The development incentive measures
may include, but are not limited to, incentives or concessions relating to parking, height, floor
space, coverage and density. Such incentives could involve an increase in the floor space or
density otherwise permitted in terms of this development management scheme.” The latter
provides for The DO provides “a mechanism for designating development density measures to
land in order to establish development priorities and strategies as may be identified . . . . The
development density measures may include the setting of specific minimum or maximum
development densities (e.g. erf sizes) given the availability of invested infrastructure or lack
of available infrastructure, and may also include incentive measures to encourage and support
development priorities and strategies.” Neither states any general provisions. There are
specific restrictions on DO that are not relevant here.

60

See generally supra note 1.

61

See supra note 47 at 2-4.
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experiences of inclusionary housing efforts, however, demonstrates that, given
consensus about the importance of both affordable housing provision and
inclusion as goals of a land management process, when such programs are made
mandatory they are most successful. 62
This is to recognize that in societies like the United States and South
Africa, whose histories have been marred by deliberate, legalized racial
suppression and oppression, that a conscious effort is undertaken to address the
causes and effects of that history in land management. Myron Orfield, a
longtime analyst of the effects of legalized racial segregation in United States
life and law, thus suggests a detailed effort that integrates inclusionary housing
with other forms of social-political engineering, from stakeholder identification
and involvement to linking the affordable, inclusionary housing to improved
services like transportation. 63 The nature of the engagement recalls rather
directly the same sorts of appeals coming from South African sources. 64
In other words, in both social contexts, practitioners and scholars alike
recognize the need to develop solutions that force the hands of citizens with
strategies that promote the goal not just with “vertical diffusion” (that is, from
the top down) but also with “horizontal diffusion” – that is communication of
the goal among different social sectors. 65 One manner to make this “diffusion”
appealing – from whatever direction, is to focus not just on the advantages that
an inclusionary model has in terms of constructing more robust, integrated
societies and economies, but also by incorporating sustainable technologies into
the designs, such as green roofs and other energy-saving and carbonneutralizing efforts. 66 That is, the models diffused need be characterized not as
some kind of penance for past wrongs but as part of a new vision of what a
better-functioning society might look like.
Another, more recent alternative is a hybrid “voluntary-mandatory”
inclusionary development model in which:
a growth restriction is imposed by ordinance that limits the
number of dwelling units that can be constructed in any given
year. To determine which development applications will be
approved, the municipality holds a “beauty contest” whereby
project sponsors compete to present the most desirable project.
By awarding points for the inclusion of affordable units in the
62

Id. at 9.

63

Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial
Residential Segregation, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 877 (2006).

64

See, e.g., supra note 5; see also supra note 19 at 11.

65

Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn; Innovation and Diffusion in Civil Rights Law, 79
Law & Contemp. Probs. 115, 137-140 (2016).
66

See supra note 50.
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proposed development, the municipality is able to leverage its
growth cap by encouraging developers to volunteer” to include
affordable units in this manner to enhance their opportunity to
be awarded their approvals. 67
This approach may have the advantage of reducing challenges arguing that
property rights have been denied by state activity.
IV.

CONCLUSION: CAN PRO-DENSITY HOUSING WORK IN CAPE TOWN?

To be sure, the discussions we had in Cape Town, supported by the
literature on the challenges of spatial development in South Africa, 68 made clear
that no single effort – whether focused on density or any other goal, will be the
magical solution to resolve the city’s and the country’s housing needs – which
include both a need for more and better quality affordable housing, and also, if
a more cohesive social order is desired, more inclusionary housing patterns.
Nonetheless, this article aims to suggest that, if Cape Town is truly dedicated to
providing better affordable and more inclusionary housing, that density efforts
have several distinct advantages. First, a discussion about them can focus
consideration of the kind of city and region the population desires. This is
especially true, of course, if that discussion is conducted broadly throughout the
society. Second, if an UGB and a density bonus incentive program are part of a
menu of other social engineering designed to create more opportunity and
economic growth, and are properly structured to assure developer profit, they
can establish a new norm of neighbourhoods that are mixed as to income and
use, making for an even more robust urban environment. Third, density
incentives can reduce sprawl and control the growth of the urban footprint, with
positive benefits for the physical and built environments. As it happens, all three
goals appear not just in the United States’ academic literature examining
density-forcing techniques. 69 The goals also appear in South African spatial
management and land use law literature, even when that literature cautions
about not presuming to copy the models of more economically developed
countries with better established democratic and bureaucratic structures. 70 That
similarity alone gives me some hope that there may be some merit in what is
proposed here. Moreover, there is a concrete legal instrument waiting to be more
fully articulated to secure the ideal of a denser, more inclusionary Cape Town,
namely the 2015 By-Law. 71 The moment is now.
67

See supra note 47 at 8.

68

See, e.g., Berrisford supra note 1 and Denoon-Stevens, supra note 5.

69

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

70

See, e.g. supra note 19.

71

Supra note 59.
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